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Introduction 
The question whether or under what circumstances college and 
university administrators can be subject to liability for failing to prevent a 
student’s suicide has been the subject of several notable court decisions—
and a great many more articles and conference presentations—in recent 
years.  The prospect of such liability is a powerful force.  If educational 
institutions and their administrators1 can be found liable for the failure to 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ The author is a partner at Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP in Boston, where 
his practice principally involves advising and representing colleges, universities, and 
independent schools, including in matters involving student mental health issues.  He 
represented the universities and their administrators in two of the cases discussed below, 
Shin v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Carman v. Shaffer. 
 1. I use the term "administrator" in this Article to mean all college or university 
employees—including primarily deans and residential life staff but also including other staff 
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prevent a student’s suicide, they will respond in ways that are calculated to 
minimize that risk.  Indeed, as further discussed below, we have observed 
this force at work in recent years.  The problem—the duty paradox—is that 
imposing upon college and university administrators a legal duty to prevent 
student suicides ultimately makes students less safe because it deters 
administrators from becoming involved with students who may be at risk of 
self-harm.  Consider the following, unfortunately common, scenario: 
John, a college sophomore, goes to see one of the associate deans in 
the office of student affairs.  John tells the dean that he is deeply concerned 
about Mary, a freshman who lives in his residence hall.  John believes Mary 
is depressed.  She always seems sad and withdrawn.  She rarely leaves her 
room.  She is falling badly behind in her classes and is skipping them much 
of the time.  She appears to be eating little or nothing.  Several of Mary’s 
friends say that she is cutting herself.  John has heard a rumor that Mary 
attempted suicide the previous semester by taking an overdose of pills.  
Mary has told several students that she is seeing a psychologist at the 
college health center; however, some friends believe that she stopped going 
once the psychologist suggested that she needed medication.  John also has 
heard that Mary is desperately afraid of her parents finding out that she is 
struggling at school and has sought mental health treatment.  Mary has 
many friends, who are trying their best to support and watch out for her.  
John thinks that these friends are trying to do too much by themselves, and 
that instead they should be encouraging Mary to get more help from the 
college.  John has come to the dean because last night he heard that Mary 
was very upset and was describing her situation as hopeless. 
How do we think the associate dean should respond?  What would we 
think if the associate dean said to John the following? 
I realize this is upsetting, but I’m not in a position to do anything about 
this.  I don’t know Mary.  I don’t have any first-hand knowledge of her 
situation.  Most of what you have told me is hearsay and rumor.  And 
assuming Mary is depressed, as you think she might be, then she has a 
mental health problem that I am not qualified to address.  I am a dean, 
not a psychiatrist.  It also sounds like Mary has been, and may still be, in 
treatment with one of our clinicians.  You should encourage her to go to 
the health center.  They have the expertise to deal with these things, and 
I don’t. 
                                                                                                                 
and faculty—who are not medical or mental health professionals.  The legal duty analysis 
with respect to clinicians is entirely different from that relating to nonclinical employees.  It 
is well settled that a clinician owes a duty of reasonable care to his or her patient or client. 
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Is that how we think the associate dean should respond—by essentially 
refusing to become involved?  Don’t we instead want the dean to actively 
address Mary’s situation, and to do so with a sense of urgency?  Shouldn’t 
the dean immediately be thinking about such steps as calling Mary to see if 
she will come in to meet with him? Reaching out to Mary’s resident 
assistant or other residential life staff who might be knowledgeable about 
the situation? Reaching out to Mary’s professors to determine whether in 
fact she is skipping classes and falling behind, and whether her professors 
are concerned about her? 
It is self-evident that the latter approach is better than the former.  We 
want college administrators to engage with and use their best efforts to 
assist, not avoid, students who may be at risk of suicide or otherwise 
suffering from a serious mental health issue.  A more difficult question is 
whether we need a new set of legal rules to encourage or require college 
administrators to engage in this way, or whether existing rules—which 
generally will result in a finding of no legal duty to prevent suicide—in fact 
are more likely to produce the best results. 
A leading proponent of the need for new legal rules is Peter F. Lake, a 
professor at Stetson University College of Law, whose work often 
addresses the question of what legal duties colleges and universities have, 
or ought to have, to protect their students from foreseeable risks of harm.2  
In Professor Lake’s view, "colleges and universities desperately need more 
legal guidance on the parameters of managing student suicide danger."3  He 
believes that a "student suicide crisis" is "in full swing,"4 and that colleges 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See, e.g., ROBERT D. BICKEL & PETER F. LAKE, THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY:  WHO ASSUMES THE RISKS OF COLLEGE LIFE? (1999); Peter F. 
Lake, Private Law Continues to Come to Campus:  Rights and Responsibilities Revisited, 31 
J.C. & U.L. 621 (2005); Peter F. Lake & Nancy Tribbensee, The Emerging Crisis of College 
Student Suicide:  Law and Policy Responses to Serious Forms of Self-Inflicted Injury, 32 
STETSON L. REV. 125 (2002). 
 3. Peter F. Lake, Still Waiting:  The Slow Evolution of the Law in Light of the 
Ongoing Student Suicide Crisis, 34 J.C. & U.L. 253, 254 (2008). 
 4. Id.   
The first wave of litigation [involving student suicide] has served to bring student 
suicide and student wellness issues out of the closet, but we need more than a 
smattering of cases with inconsistent results.  Everywhere in America, in every type 
of institution of higher education, administrators make life and death decisions with 
imprecise and incomplete guidance from the law. . . . There is a cost when neither 
courts nor legislatures articulate the ways in which general legal principles apply in 
the college and university context and fail to consider the impact upon administrators 
of partial, incomplete, or inconsistent legal commands.  At this time, the law is 
failing colleges and universities with respect to the mental health crisis.   
Id. 
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and universities have not responded to this "crisis" adequately, at least in 
part because college administrators engage in too much "balkanization, 
information siloing, and self-help," rather than effectively sharing 
information and coordinating their efforts.5  The solution to this problem, in 
Professor Lake’s view, should be in the form of new, specific "legal 
commands"6 that come from appellate courts or state legislatures.7 
Ann MacLean Massie, a professor at Washington and Lee University 
School of Law, shares Professor Lake’s view and goes even further by 
proposing specifically what that "legal command" should be.  Professor 
Massie proposes adopting as a "rule of law" that when a college or 
university administrator "has actual knowledge" that an undergraduate 
student has made a suicide attempt or is "seriously suicidal," the 
administrator has an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to protect the 
student from self-harm—a duty that would include, but not be limited to, 
notifying the student’s parents or reporting the information to some other 
college administrator who has authority to notify the parents.8 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See id. at 256.  Professor Lake asserts more generally that "higher education’s 
organizational models tend to work against the very needs that arise in critical incident 
response and prevention. . . .  Competition among departments, fear of responsibility, a 
desire to blame others, and often false hopes that ignoring a program will make it go away 
while in a specific department—all contribute to an overall environment in which rapid [and 
coordinated] response to critical incidents is not encouraged."  Id. at 280. 
 6. Id. at 254. 
 7. Id. at 255–56.  "[H]igher education is still waiting for the legal system to catch up 
to the [student mental health] crisis. . . .  In many states, and with respect to many issues, 
colleges and universities, students, parents, and others must still wait to receive necessary, 
basic governing rules. . . .  This article serves as a call to action for courts and legislatures to 
move quickly in assisting higher education."  Id. at 255–56.  "The law is drifting, and seems 
to have no particular course.  Most disturbing is the fact that lawmakers have shown no 
sense of urgency in, at least, offering basic governing principles to most or all institutions."  
Id. at 256. 
 8. Ann MacLean Massie, Suicide on Campus:  The Appropriate Legal Responsibility 
of College Personnel, 91 MARQUETTE L. REV. 625, 679 (2008).  Professor Massie’s 
proposed rule, in full, is as follows: 
When an administrator at an institution of higher education (including faculty) 
has actual knowledge of a suicide attempt on the part of an enrolled 
undergraduate student, or of other circumstances indicating that the student is 
seriously suicidal, that administrator has a duty to take reasonable steps to 
protect the student from self-harm, including, but not limited to, notifying the 
student’s parents or guardian or reporting the information to an administrator 
who has authority to make such notification.  This duty may extend to other 
reasonable steps to protect the student’s safety, such as contacting campus 
counselors or campus security officers, who might have the authority to take 
custody of a student presenting a danger to self or others.  It may also include 
other actions, depending upon what is reasonable under the circumstances. 
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Such calls for the articulation of new legal duties on the part of college 
and university administrators are well meaning, but are flawed in several 
respects.  First, they are mistaken to the extent they portray the current state 
of the law as being woefully incomplete or confusing—consisting, as 
Professor Lake puts it, of "a smattering of cases with inconsistent results," 
which has delivered only "partial, incomplete or inconsistent legal 
commands."9  To the contrary, the case law generally presents a consistent, 
principled, and well-reasoned approach to the legal duties of college and 
university administrators, which, with rare exceptions, results in a finding 
that administrators have no legal duty to prevent student suicide.  While 
there are two trial court decisions that found that administrators could have 
a duty to prevent suicide, these two decisions are not well-reasoned and 
have not been followed in subsequent cases.  Thus, they stand as isolated 
exceptions to what has remained the strong general view:  that colleges and 
their administrators have no legal duty to protect students from even 
foreseeable risks of harm, as long as the risk was not one that the college 
itself created or one as to which the student was uniquely dependent on the 
college for protection—neither of which usually is true in a case involving 
student suicide. 
Second, calls for the imposition of new legal duties rest on the 
mistaken view that new duty rules are needed in order for college 
administrators to "do the right thing."  They assume that the reported facts 
of a very small number of student suicide cases are indicative of how 
situations involving at-risk students typically are handled; that there has 
been little if any change in the way that colleges and their administrators 
respond to at-risk students in recent years; and that college and university 
administrators need "more legal guidance" from judges or legislators about 
how to do their job.  These assumptions are not well-founded. 
Finally, and most importantly, the imposition of new legal duties—in 
particular any duty resembling the one that Professor Massie proposes—are 
unworkable and would have the opposite of their intended effect. Such 
duties would make students less safe, because they would incentivize 
college administrators not to become involved with at-risk students.  Under 
Professor Massie’s proposed "rule of law," whether an administrator has a 
legal duty depends upon whether the administrator has "actual knowledge" 
that a student may be at risk of suicide.10  But if the administrator’s "actual 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 9. Lake, supra note 3, at 254. 
 10. See Massie, supra note 8, at 679. 
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knowledge" of that risk will determine whether the administrator has a legal 
duty—i.e., whether he faces exposure to personal liability—then the 
administrator will have every incentive not to acquire such knowledge.  
Instead, his incentive will be to respond in just the way that we do not want 
the associate dean to respond in the scenario described above:  by declaring 
his lack of expertise in addressing mental health issues, declaring his lack 
of first-hand knowledge about the student at issue, and determining firmly 
not to acquire such knowledge or otherwise become involved. 
I.  The Legal Landscape After a Decade of Cases Involving Suicide and 
Disability Discrimination Claims 
 
A.  Many Students with Significant Mental Health Issues, but Few Lawsuits 
Arising from Student Suicides 
It has been well documented that colleges and universities have large 
and increasing numbers of students with serious mental health issues, and 
that the seriousness of those issues is increasing as well.11  Some of these 
students present a very real risk of harm to themselves or others or both.  
The commonly cited estimate of the rate of suicide among college 
undergraduates in the United States is 7.5 per 100,000 students, which 
means that on average about 1,100 undergraduates in the U.S. commit 
suicide each year.12  That is a considerable number, to be sure.  But it is also 
                                                                                                                 
 11. For example, a 2003 survey of nearly twenty thousand American college students 
revealed that approximately forty-five percent reported feeling "so depressed it was difficult 
to function" at least once during the 2002–2003 school year; thirty percent reported suffering 
from an anxiety disorder or depression; and more than ten percent reported having seriously 
considered attempting suicide.  MICHAEL HAINES ET AL., AMERICAN COLLEGE HEALTH 
ASSOCIATION & NATIONAL COLLEGE HEALTH ASSESSMENT:  REFERENCE GROUP EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 13–14 (2003), available at http://www.achancha.org/docs/ACHA-NCHA_ 
Reference_Group_ExecutiveSummary_Spring2003.pdf.  See also Sherry A. Benton et al., 
Changes in Counseling Center Client Problems Across 13 Years, 34 PROF. PSYCHOL.:  RES. 
& PRAC. 66, 66–71 (2003) (citing several studies that describe perceived increases in levels 
of psychopathology and symptom severity among counseling center clients, and noting that 
at the authors’ university the number of students with depression had doubled and the 
number of suicidal students had tripled between 1989 and 2001); Massie, supra note 8, at 
635, 636 & n.52 (noting that "campus counseling centers have seen dramatic increases in 
their caseloads over just the past few years" and that "the students they are seeing are 
reportedly sicker and more often in need of hospitalization than used to be the case") (citing, 
inter alia, ROBERT P. GALLAGHER, NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSELING CENTER DIRECTORS 
(2004), available at http://iacsinc.org/2004%20Survey%20final-1.pdf). 
 12. See Massie, supra note 8, at 633–34 (citing, inter alia, Morton M. Silverman et al., 
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true that the average incidence of suicide among college and university 
students is significantly less than the average incidence for that age group 
generally.13  These statistics suggest not only that some frequency of 
suicides on college and university campuses is simply unavoidable, 
notwithstanding the best efforts of administrators and clinicians,14 but also 
that there are some preventive effects associated with the college and 
university environment,15 and perhaps even that colleges and universities 
are actually getting some things right in their efforts to address the risk of 
suicide.16 
                                                                                                                 
The Big Ten Suicide Study:  A 10-Year Study of Suicides on Midwestern University 
Campuses, 27 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 285 (1997)). 
 13. Silverman et al., supra note 12, at 299. 
 14. Even psychiatrists and other mental health professionals rarely are held liable for 
failing to prevent suicide, both because it is virtually impossible to predict suicide in an 
individual patient, and because how best to respond to a patient’s suicidal ideation often 
involves difficult clinical judgments.  Suicide is so unpredictable that the law rarely imposes 
liability on even a psychiatrist or other caregiver when the suicidal patient is not in the 
caregiver’s physical custody.  See GARY PAVELA, THE DISMISSAL OF STUDENTS WITH 
MENTAL DISORDERS 34 (1985) (asserting that "even for institutions such as hospitals, courts 
have recognized ‘the difficulty of preventing suicide’ and are ‘reluctant to 
impose . . . liability in all but the most egregious circumstances,’" and that educational 
institutions have "distinctly" less capability than mental hospitals "to effectively supervise 
and control a resident population"); Douglas G. Jacobs et al., Suicide Assessment:  An 
Overview and Recommended Protocol, in THE HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL GUIDE TO 
SUICIDE ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 3 (Douglas G. Jacobs ed., 1999) (stating that 
suicide is difficult to predict, and suicidal behavior is difficult to treat, in large part because 
suicide is quite rare, even among those who engage in suicidal ideation or otherwise are 
deemed to be most at risk); id. at 20 (even for trained mental health professionals, "reliable 
prediction of individual suicide at a specific time is impossible"); 23 AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH 
SUICIDAL BEHAVIORS, Nov. 2003, at 12, available at http://www.psych.org/psych_ 
pract/treatg/pg/prac_guide.cfm (stating that the rarity of suicide, even in groups known to be 
at a higher risk than the general population, makes it impossible to predict) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Michael F. Heiman, The 
Suicidal Patient:  Principles of Assessment, Treatment, and Case Management, 155 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1621, 1621 (1998) (recognizing "that the mental health profession does not 
currently possess the technology for accurate prediction or prevention of [suicide]," and the 
"inescapable fact that the power to commit suicide or engage in suicidal behavior is finally 
and completely in the hands of [the] patient" (quoting JOHN A. CHILES M.D. & KIRK D. 
STROHSAL, THE SUICIDAL PATIENT:  PRINCIPLES OF ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND CASE 
MANAGEMENT 282 (1995))). 
 15. The college environment is naturally rich with opportunities for students to find 
social support—from fellow students, faculty members, and administrators—and "[m]any 
studies conclude that social support is protective against depression and suicide.  See Jacobs 
et al., supra note 14, at 31.  See also Massie, supra note 8, at 673 (recognizing that "students 
may well not have access at home to the resources available at the college or university"). 
 16. See Massie, supra note 8, at 634–35 (stating that many colleges and universities in 
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It also should be noted that while a substantial number of suicides 
occur on college campuses each year, only a very small fraction of those 
tragedies result in litigation.  (Indeed, there are vastly more articles and 
papers concerning the legal duty of college administrators with respect to 
student suicide than there are actual lawsuits.)  That fact alone calls into 
serious question Professor Lake’s assertion that "colleges and universities 
desperately need more legal guidance on the parameters of managing 
student suicide danger."17  If the risk of litigation arising from a student 
suicide is remote, that only further confirms what should be self-
evident:  that college and university administrators should be looking to 
mental health experts—not judges and legislators—for guidance in how 
best to address the risks of student suicide. 
Why so few student suicides result in litigation is an interesting 
question, to which there are undoubtedly multiple answers.  Some suicides 
occur entirely without warning to university administrators, in which case 
there obviously is no basis for seeking to hold them accountable for failing 
to prevent it.  In other cases, where administrators did have some 
knowledge of a risk of suicide, the family will recognize that the 
administrators acted reasonably under the circumstances, and that the 
suicide simply was not avoidable.  In many cases the parents also will have 
been aware of the student’s problems—sometimes to a greater degree than 
college officials—and if the parents were unable to prevent the suicide, they 
reasonably will not expect that college or university administrators should 
have been able to do so.  For all these reasons, it is a rare case in which 
parents believe not only that campus administrators were negligent in their 
response to a foreseeable risk of suicide, but also that a different response 
by those administrators ultimately in fact would have prevented the suicide.  
And even then, parents may be deterred from filing a lawsuit by the 
daunting prospect that litigation presents—a long and costly process that 
will lay bare the most highly personal information about their child, and 
often about the parents themselves, and which will be deeply painful for the 
parents, other family members, and friends. 
Moreover, if the parents are well advised by legal counsel, they will 
understand that the prospects for establishing liability on the part of a 
college or its administrators are usually slim. Contrary to Professor Lake’s 
                                                                                                                 
recent years have substantially increased and improved the availability of mental health 
resources for their students and have instituted various programs aimed at identifying and 
helping those students who are at greatest risk). 
 17. Lake, supra note 3, at 254. 
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assertion that there is a "desperate need for more legal guidance" in this 
area,18 there is in fact a well-developed body of law that addresses the 
question of when a college or its administrators may have a duty to protect 
students from a foreseeable risk of harm, including a risk of self-harm. 
Courts across a wide range of cases, including those involving student 
suicides, hold with rare exception that no such legal duty exists. 
B.  Jain v. Iowa 
The leading case on liability for a college student’s suicide—and the 
only recent appellate decision—is the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2000 decision 
in Jain v. Iowa.19  The court held that the University of Iowa had no duty to 
prevent the suicide of a student, Sanjay Jain, in his dormitory room even 
though university officials knew Sanjay was at risk and recently had 
attempted suicide, and even though university officials failed to follow a 
university policy of notifying parents if a student engages in self-injurious 
behavior.20  The plaintiff in Jain, Sanjay’s father, conceded "that the law 
generally imposes no duty upon an individual to protect another person 
from self-inflicted harm in the absence of a ‘special relationship,’ [which is] 
usually custodial in nature," and that a university’s relationship with its 
students is not a custodial one.21  He claimed instead "that the university’s 
knowledge of the student’s mental condition or emotional state requiring 
medical care created a special relationship giving rise to an affirmative duty 
of care toward him."22  Specifically, he argued that a duty arose under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 323, which provides that one who 
voluntarily undertakes to aid another is subject to liability if he fails to 
exercise reasonable care in that undertaking and that failure affirmatively 
increases the risk of harm or the harm is suffered because of the other 
person’s reliance on that undertaking.23  In this case university employees 
had undertaken to aid Sanjay, including by recommending that he seek 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. 
 19. Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 2000). 
 20. Id. at 297–300.  In the only other appellate decision to address the issue, the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin similarly held that a counseling dean who had terminated his 
counseling relationship with a student had no duty to prevent student’s suicide.  Bogust v. 
Iverson, 102 N.W.2d 228, 233 (Wis. 1960). 
 21. Jain, 617 N.W.2d at 297. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 297–99. 
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counseling and by seeking his permission to contact his parents (which 
Sanjay refused).24  However, the Court found no duty existed because 
nothing the university did affirmatively increased Sanjay’s risk of self-harm 
and there was no evidence that Sanjay relied to his detriment on any of the 
efforts that university administrators made to assist him.25 
The decision in Jain is well-reasoned.  It is entirely consistent with 
general tort principles, including not only the general principles as to when 
a duty of care can arise by virtue of a "voluntary undertaking," but also the 
specific principles courts have applied with respect to the prevention of 
suicide.26  Courts consistently have held that persons who are not treating 
clinicians have a duty to prevent suicide only in two very limited 
circumstances:  (1) if they actually caused the decedent’s suicidal 
condition,27 or (2) if they had the decedent in their physical custody (e.g., a 
mental hospital or prison), such that the decedent was dependent on them 
for protection, and they had knowledge of the decedent’s risk of suicide.28 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. at 299. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 297–99. 
 27. See, e.g., Wallace v. Broyles, 961 S.W.2d 712, 719 (Ark. 1998) (finding that the 
evidence raised issues of fact when a university allegedly caused student’s suicidal condition 
where university supplied student, an injured football player, with heavy dosages of a strong 
pain killer that came with warnings of potentially addictive and depressive effects, including 
suicidal ideation or attempts); see also McGrath v. Dominican Coll., 672 F. Supp. 2d 477, 
486 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that a student committed suicide after her college allegedly 
exhibited gross indifference in response to her report that she had been raped at a party on 
campus by three men, including two students of the college). 
 28. Ordinarily tort law addresses the question whether a person who has been harmed 
by someone else—either the defendant or some third person—has a right to recover damages 
from the defendant for that harm.  Claims for failure to prevent a suicide are fundamentally 
different, as they involve harm that was intentionally self-inflicted.  Whether the harm 
occurs or not is ultimately in the hands of the plaintiff’s decedent.  Courts have recognized 
this unique quality of claims involving a failure to prevent suicide and accordingly hold as a 
general rule that someone other than a treating clinician has no duty to prevent suicide as a 
matter of law unless the defendant caused the suicidal condition or had physical custody of 
the decedent.  See McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983) ("As a general 
rule, negligence actions seeking damages for the suicide of another will not lie because the 
act of suicide is considered a deliberate, intentional and intervening act which precludes a 
finding that a given defendant, in fact, is responsible for the harm.") (collecting authorities); 
Nelson v. Mass. Port Auth., 771 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (finding that the 
port authority had no duty to prevent a person from committing suicide by jumping from a 
bridge owned by the port authority, even though such suicides occurred there on average 
once per month, because the authority neither caused the decedent’s suicidal condition nor 
had custody of him along with knowledge of his suicidal ideation); see also Hickey v. 
Zezulka, 487 N.W.2d 106, 119 (Mich. 1992) (finding that a campus police officer owed duty 
of care to an arrestee she placed in a university holding cell and could be found liable for 
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The decision in Jain also fits squarely with the general approach that 
courts have taken in cases involving other, more common risks of harm to 
college and university students, such as the risk of harm arising from 
alcohol or drug use or from an assault.  Since the 1970s, with the decline of 
the doctrine of in loco parentis, courts consistently have recognized that 
college students are adults who are fundamentally responsible for their own 
well-being.  Thus, "the general rule is that no special relationship exists 
between a college and its . . . students,"29 and that colleges have no legal 
duty to protect their students from harm, even when the harm is entirely 
foreseeable and even when the harm arises in the context of conduct that is 
unlawful or is in violation of college policies or both.30  The cases in which 
a college or university has been held to owe a student a duty of care have 
generally been limited to the narrow circumstances in which (1) the 
student’s harm was not self-inflicted, and (2) the student was uniquely 
dependent on the university for protection from a third party31 or was 
injured in the course of activity that the university encouraged or that was 
undertaken on the university’s behalf.32 
                                                                                                                 
failing to check on the arrestee and failing to remove his belt, which he used to commit 
suicide). 
 29. Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). 
 30. See, e.g., Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 22 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a college 
owed no duty to protect its students and their guests from harm arising from drinking and 
snowmobiling on a frozen lake immediately adjacent to campus, even though the harm was 
foreseeable and college officials had taken some steps to intervene); Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 
612 F.2d 135, 141–42 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that the college owed no duty to a student 
injured in a car accident where driver became intoxicated at a class picnic, even though 
college was aware of and arguably facilitated the underage drinking); Robertson v. State of 
La., 747 So. 2d 1276, 1281 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (university owed no duty to intoxicated 
student who fell from roof of university building even though university knew inebriated 
students previously were injured in the same way); Tanja H. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278 
Cal. Rptr. 918, 921–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that the university had no duty to 
prevent sexual assault that followed heavy drinking in violation of school rules). 
 31. See, e.g., Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 336–38 (Mass. 1983) 
(finding that the college owed a duty to resident students to take reasonable measures to 
secure dormitories against intruders); Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 519–20 (Del. 
1991) (holding that the university owed student injured in hazing incident duty with respect 
to risk of foreseeable assault occurring on its property); Knoll v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Neb., 601 N.W.2d 757, 761–63 (Neb. 1999) (finding that a university could owe duty to a 
student if the risk posed to the student in a hazing incident was foreseeable). 
 32. See, e.g., Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360, 1367 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(concluding that a college that actively recruited a student-athlete for its own benefit had a 
duty to be reasonably prepared for medical emergencies that might arise during student’s 
participation in scheduled practice sponsored and supervised by college); McClure v. 
Fairfield Univ., No. CV000159028, 2003 WL 21524786, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 
2003) (finding that the university owed a duty to student struck by car while walking to off-
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C.  Schieszler v. Ferrum College and Shin v. MIT 
Notwithstanding the strength of the Iowa Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Jain, and the firm foundation of precedent on which it 
was based, the case was followed in relatively short order by a pair of 
trial court decisions—Schieszler v. Ferrum College and Shin v. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology—which found that college 
administrators could have a duty of care with respect to a student’s risk 
of suicide, at least in circumstances where the administrators had 
actual knowledge of an "imminent probability" of harm if they failed 
to act.33  However, as discussed below, these two decisions are 
narrowly limited to their particular facts; they were not reviewed on 
appeal (both cases settled before any trial); and—because they are not 
well-reasoned—they have not been followed in subsequent cases, 
which have returned to the principles that guided the court in Jain. 
In Schieszler, the student who ultimately committed suicide, 
Michael Frentzel, sent his girlfriend a note indicating that he intended 
to hang himself.34  The girlfriend reported the threat to her resident 
assistant, who called the campus police.35  The resident assistant and 
campus police went to Michael’s room, where they found him with 
self-inflicted bruises on his head.36  The campus police referred 
Michael to the dean of students, who required Michael to sign a 
statement promising that he would not hurt himself.37  Michael 
subsequently sent his girlfriend another note, which evidenced further 
suicidal ideation.38  The girlfriend reported this as well but the 
college’s administrators took no action except to forbid the girlfriend 
from visiting Michael’s dormitory.39  When Michael sent his girlfriend 
yet another troubling note campus officials went to his dormitory room 
where they found that he had hanged himself.40 
                                                                                                                 
campus beach area where university effectively encouraged students to go there to drink 
alcohol and to use university’s shuttle service, which allegedly was inadequate). 
 33. Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (W.D. Va. 2002); Shin v. 
Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101, at *13 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 
2005). 
 34. Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d. at 605. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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Michael’s aunt and guardian sued the college, the dean of 
students, and the resident assistant in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Virginia, claiming that the defendants knew 
or should have known that Michael was likely to attempt to hurt 
himself if not properly supervised and that they took no steps to do 
so.41  The college and its administrators moved to dismiss the 
complaint, arguing among other things that they had no duty to prevent 
Michael’s suicide as a matter of law.42  The court denied the motion.43  
Applying Virginia law, the court determined that "[w]hile it is unlikely 
that Virginia would conclude that a special relationship exists as a 
matter of law between colleges and universities and their students, it 
might find that a special relationship exists on the particular facts 
alleged in this case," i.e., based upon the defendants’ awareness of "an 
imminent probability" that Michael would try to hurt himself if they 
failed to act.44 
The decision in Schieszler is flawed in several significant 
respects.  First, the court found that a duty to prevent suicide may arise 
outside the limited circumstances in which a defendant has caused the 
decedent’s suicidal condition or had the decedent in physical custody, 
contrary to the well-settled principles that long have governed liability 
claims for failure to prevent suicide. 
Second, the court ostensibly based its finding of a "special 
relationship" on the principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, sections 314A and 315(b), but the court’s reasoning in fact is 
contrary to the principles laid out in the Restatement.  The court found 
that the defendants could have a duty of care because of the sheer 
foreseeability of harm if they failed to act.45  However, finding a duty 
on the basis of foreseeability alone blatantly ignores the core principle 
of Restatement section 314:  "The fact that the actor realizes or should 
realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 605–06. 
 43. Id. at 614. 
 44. Id. at 609. 
 45. In light of the evidence that the defendants were aware of Michael’s "emotional 
problems," his self-inflicted bruises, and the notes "suggesting that he intended to kill 
himself, a trier of fact could conclude that there was an imminent probability that [Michael] 
would try to hurt himself . . . and that the defendants had notice of this specific harm.  Thus, 
[the Court finds] the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support her claim that a special 
relationship existed between [Michael] and defendants giving rise to a duty to protect 
[Michael] from the foreseeable danger that he would hurt himself."  Id. 
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protection does not impose upon him a special duty to take such 
action."46 
Third, the Scheiszler court erroneously relied on Mullins v. Pine 
Manor College,47 a case frequently—and mistakenly—cited for the 
proposition that colleges generally have a duty of care to protect their 
resident students from foreseeable harm.  The holding and rationale of 
Mullins in fact is much narrower.  The court in that case found that, 
under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323, a college had a duty 
to take reasonable steps to protect freshman students from assault by 
an intruder in a residence hall where (1) the student was required to 
live in the residence hall, (2) the college had undertaken a number of 
measures to address the risk of assault by intruders, and (3) there was 
evidence from which the jury could infer that the plaintiff relied on the 
adequacy of those precautions in deciding which college to attend.48  
This rationale in Mullins has no application to cases involving students 
at risk of harm from their own mental health issues.  Students are not 
required to obtain mental health services from their colleges and in any 
event there rarely if ever will be any evidence that the student chose to 
attend a particular school in reliance upon the mental health services 
the student expected to receive there.  Moreover, the risk of self-harm, 
which ultimately is within the student’s exclusive control, is distinctly 
different from the risk of assault by a third party, which the school can 
be in the best position to prevent. 
The Schieszler decision also lacks persuasive value because it 
fails to address the holding and reasoning of Jain and the earlier case 
of Bogust v. Iverson,49 which are the only two appellate court decisions 
                                                                                                                 
 46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A. 
 47. Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 610 (W.D. Va. 2002) (citing 
Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983)). 
 48. Id. at 336–37.  The court in Mullins also found that a duty to protect college 
freshmen from assault by an intruder in their dormitory could be grounded in "societal 
expectations" because:  the risk of harm had been created by the college setting itself (on the 
theory that concentrations of young women attract assailants); the college required freshmen 
to live in the dormitory; and only the college was in a position to provide the necessary 
security measures as the students were in no position to hire security guards or install their 
own door locks.  Id. at 335–36.  No such "societal expectations" exist with respect to the 
duty to prevent suicide.  Colleges do not create that risk, and in any event students are not 
dependent on the college for help in addressing that risk.  To the contrary, as the court in 
Jain recognized, students are free to obtain assistance with their mental health issues off-
campus.  Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Iowa 2000). 
 49. Bogust v. Iverson, 102 N.W.2d 228, 233 (Wis. 1960) (affirming the trial court’s 
ruling that a counseling dean had no duty to prevent a student’s suicide). 
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to address the question whether college or university officials can have 
a legal duty to prevent student suicide.  The court did so because the 
plaintiff at oral argument abandoned her contention that a duty should 
be found under the "voluntary undertaking" principles of Restatement 
section 323, on which the decisions in Jain and Bogust were based.50 
Notwithstanding its many flaws, the decision in Schieszler was 
followed three years later by a Massachusetts trial court judge in Shin 
v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.51  That case involved a 
student at MIT, Elizabeth Shin, who died in a fire in her dormitory 
room.52  Elizabeth’s parents, who initially believed that her death was a 
suicide, sued MIT along with a number of MIT administrators and 
several psychiatrists at the MIT Health Center where Elizabeth had 
been in treatment.53  The administrators were generally aware of 
Elizabeth’s ongoing mental health problems and had heard that she had 
threatened to commit suicide on the day that the fire occurred.54  The 
administrators believed that some intervention by mental health 
professionals was necessary; they conveyed their concerns to the 
psychiatrists at MIT; and they believed that the psychiatrists would 
take steps to contact Elizabeth and assess her that day.55  However, the 
administrators did not take any steps to check on Elizabeth during the 
day themselves or to confirm that the psychiatrists had seen her.56  As 
it turned out, the psychiatrists called Elizabeth and left her a phone 
message in which they confirmed the availability of an intake 
appointment for her the following day at an intensive outpatient 
treatment center that Elizabeth recently had agreed to attend, and in 
which they confirmed their availability to her in the meantime; but 
they never actually saw her that day.57 
Elizabeth’s parents claimed that the administrators and clinicians 
were negligent in failing to take reasonable steps to address the risk 
that Elizabeth would harm herself.58  The administrators moved for 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d. at 608. 
 51. Shin v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
June 27, 2005). 
 52. Id. at *5–6. 
 53. Id. at *6–8. 
 54. Id. at *5. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.at *2–5. 
 58. Id. at *9. 
44 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 029 (2010) 
summary judgment, arguing among other things that they had no duty 
to prevent Elizabeth’s alleged suicide as a matter of law.59  The trial 
court denied the motion.60  Following the decision in Schieszler, the 
court found that a duty based on a "special relationship" could exist 
because the MIT administrators "could reasonably foresee that 
Elizabeth would hurt herself without proper supervision."61 
The decision in Shin, like the Schieszler decision it followed, was 
flawed in several respects:  in finding that a "special relationship" 
effectively could be based on the foreseeability of harm alone; in 
misreading Mullins as holding that colleges and their administrators 
broadly owe "a duty to exercise care to protect the well-being of their 
resident students"; and in ignoring the well-established principle that 
no duty to prevent suicide exists on the part of a nonclinician who 
neither caused the decedent’s suicidal condition nor had the decedent 
in physical custody with knowledge of the decedent’s suicidal 
condition.62  Also like Schieszler, the Shin case settled before trial, 
with the result that the court’s holding and rationale never were 
reviewed on appeal.63 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. at *11. 
 60. Id. at *14. 
 61. Id. at *13. 
 62. The court in Shin noted the administrators’ argument that persons who are not 
treating clinicians can have no duty to prevent suicide under Massachusetts law except in 
these two situations, and went on to state, "[The administrators] correctly assert that neither 
of these two situations occurred in this case and therefore, they owed no duty to prevent 
Elizabeth’s suicide."  Id. at *11.  However, the court went on to find that the administrators, 
on the basis of a "special relationship," nevertheless could be found to have "a duty . . . to 
exercise reasonable care to protect Elizabeth from harm."  Id. at *3.  It plainly makes no 
sense to find that the administrators had a duty "to protect Elizabeth from harm," while at the 
same time finding that, under established Massachusetts law, the administrators had no duty 
to prevent the specific type of harm that allegedly had occurred.  See Lake, supra note 3, at 
274 (noting that the Shin court’s "decision is, to say the least, somewhat confusing"); 
Massie, supra note 8, at 670 (agreeing that the decision in Shin, by finding a duty based 
upon the foreseeability of harm, departs from the "special relationship" principles articulated 
in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 314, is "too open-ended" and "point[s] the way to a 
standardless and indeterminate duty"). 
 63. See Agreement Reached by MIT and the Shin Family, MITNEWS, Apr. 3, 2006, 
available at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2006/lawsuit-statement.html (announcing the 
settlement and including a statement by Elizabeth’s parents in which they revealed that over 
the course of the litigation they had "come to understand that [Elizabeth’s] death was likely a 
tragic accident" rather than a suicide) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
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D.  The Reaction and Counter-Reaction to Schieszler and Shin 
The decisions in Schieszler and especially Shin, which garnered 
tremendous publicity,64 had a profound impact on college and university 
administrators, at least in the short term.  Administrators understandably 
were alarmed by the prospect that they could be exposed to liability for 
failing to prevent a student’s suicide even if the student was in treatment 
with campus psychiatrists, and even if administrators had conveyed to those 
psychiatrists their concerns about the student’s well-being and were relying 
on the psychiatrists to assess the student’s actual risk of suicide and the 
proper course in light of that assessment.65 
In response to this alarming prospect, and faced with ever-increasing 
numbers of students with significant mental health issues, many schools 
adopted aggressive approaches to managing the risk of student suicides.  
These new approaches typically had two salient features:  first, schools 
began promptly informing parents about students’ suicidal ideation and 
other significant mental health issues, regardless of the student’s desires or 
the potential impact of such disclosures on the student’s treatment.  Second, 
schools began removing these students from campus, either by placing 
them on an involuntary medical leave of absence or by suspending them on 
disciplinary grounds for violating the school’s code of conduct.66  For 
example, a student who engaged in self-cutting behavior might be 
disciplined for violating rules that prohibit the possession of weapons; a 
student who expressed thoughts of suicide or engaged in disturbing 
behavior might be disciplined for being disruptive to the residence hall or 
other living group; and a student who expressed thoughts of suicide might 
be disciplined for violating rules that prohibit threatening harm to any 
person—in this case, the student himself. 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See Massie, supra note 8, at 627, 628 & n.7 (listing a sampling of the newspaper 
and television coverage). 
 65. See id. at 629 (describing the surprise of academia when the court denied the 
motions for summary judgment that were filed on behalf of the MIT administrators who had 
dealt with Ms. Shin). 
 66. See, e.g., Katharine A. Kaplan, Troubled Students Feel College Nudges Them off 
Campus, HARV. CRIMSON, Jan. 23, 2004, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/ 
article/2004/1/23/troubled-students-feel-college-nudges-them/ (noting that it had become 
"fairly common for universities to push mentally ill students off campus in order to avoid 
murky legal issues," and that universities across the country were looking to the Shin case to 
determine their legal exposure) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice). 
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These aggressive risk-management approaches may have reduced 
certain risks, most notably the risk that a student would commit suicide at 
school, thereby exposing the school and its administrators to liability, and 
the risk that parents would assert claims that a student suicide could have 
been prevented if only they had been more fully informed.  However, these 
risk-management responses were deeply problematic in other respects. 
First, with respect to parental notification—a primary focus of 
Professor Massie’s proposed "rule of law"67—aggressive disclosure of 
students’ information may make students less safe, rather than more so, by 
deterring students from seeking or accepting help.  Students who are at risk 
of self-harm often are determined not to have their parents or others 
informed about the nature or extent of their problems or their need for 
treatment.68  If college and university administrators disclose information 
about at-risk students to their parents or others without the student’s 
consent, this can deter students from being completely forthcoming with 
administrators or others about the nature or extent of their problems or from 
seeking help at all.  Disclosure without a student’s consent also can 
exacerbate the underlying problem where, as sometimes is the case, the 
parents are a central part of it.  Even those who tout the benefits of 
notifying parents when a student may be at risk—including Professor 
Lake—recognize "the very real possibility that . . . notification may worsen 
the problem rather than make it better" in cases where "the parent . . . may 
be a major factor in the student’s depression or suicidal ideation."69 
The aggressive separation of at-risk students from school also can have 
obviously detrimental effects not only for the particular student but also for 
others on campus who may be at risk. If the student is in treatment with 
mental health clinicians on campus, requiring the student to withdraw from 
school almost invariably will mean an end to that treatment relationship and 
an end to the clinician’s ability to monitor and assess the student’s risk of 
harm to self or others.70  Many students with access to mental health 
services on campus do not have the insurance or private ability to pay for 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See Massie, supra note 8, at 679 (proposing a rule in which parental notification is 
"a virtually automatic response" to an administrator’s knowledge of a student’s seriously 
suicidal situation). 
 68. See id. at 680 ("Students suffering mental health problems often do not wish their 
families to be contacted, and, if asked, will request that they not be."). 
 69. See Lake & Tribbensee, supra note 2, at 150. 
 70. See Massie, supra note 8, at 673 (noting that many students lack available mental 
health treatment apart from on-campus services). 
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the same care away from school.71  Requiring at-risk students to withdraw 
from student housing or from school completely can return them to what 
may be a destructive family environment and can "isolate them from their 
peers, ‘thus intensifying rather than alleviating their distress.’"72  In 
addition, an aggressive policy of removing at-risk students from school 
plainly will deter other students from coming forward and seeking 
assistance. When students understand that they risk prompt removal from 
campus if they disclose any suicidal ideation, they will be more likely to 
suffer alone and in silence, rather than seeking the help they need. The 
aggressive removal of at-risk students also will have a chilling effect on 
campus mental health providers and counselors with whom such students 
are seeking assistance.  Clinicians and counselors who are seeking to 
develop or maintain a relationship of trust with the student, and who may 
believe that the student’s removal from school would make the student less 
safe, will be loath to coordinate with administrators who otherwise might be 
called upon to obtain academic or other accommodations that would be 
helpful to the student. 
The aggressive removal of students seen to be at risk of suicide also 
may violate a student’s rights under disability discrimination laws.73  Just as 
it did not take long for the publicity around the Shin case to lead to many 
abrupt removals of at-risk students from campus, it did not take long for 
those removals to result in private lawsuits and administrative complaints 
by students claiming disability discrimination.74  In response to these 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 66 (quoting a college graduate who took time off to 
cope with his depression as stating, "[t]here are issues about what environment you are going 
back to, and what access you are going to have to health care there."). 
 72. PAVELA, supra note 14, at 57 (quoting M.L. Bernard & J.L. Bernard, Institutional 
Responses to the Suicidal Student:  Ethical and Legal Considerations, 21 J.C. STUDENT 
PERSONNEL 109, 111 (1980)). 
 73. See generally Gary Pavela, Therapeutic Paternalism and the Misuse of Mandatory 
Psychiatric Withdrawals on Campus, 9 J.C. & U.L. 101, 104–14 (1982–83).  At the federal 
level, these disability laws include Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which 
applies to all colleges and universities that receive federal funding, 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(A) 
(2010); Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act [hereinafter ADA], which applies to 
public services including those provided by public colleges and universities; and Title III of 
the ADA, which applies to places of "public accommodation," which include most private 
colleges and universities.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–34, 12182–89 (2010).  Most colleges and 
universities also will be covered by one or more state or local disability discrimination laws. 
 74. Notable among the lawsuits is the case of Jordan Nott, a student at George 
Washington University who was summarily dismissed from campus for "endangering 
behavior" in violation of the university’s Code of Conduct after he sought psychiatric help at 
the university health center for depressive thoughts relating to suicide and his use of 
antidepressants, although Nott claimed he was not suicidal at any time.  Nott sued the 
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complaints, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights has 
made clear that where a student’s actual or threatened behavior is the 
product of mental health issues that qualify as a legal disability—but the 
student remains able to meet the academic and other requirements of 
college life—disability discrimination laws prohibit the school from 
requiring the student to withdraw unless the student presents a "direct 
threat" to herself or others.  Moreover, this "direct threat" standard requires 
a "high probability of substantial harm," which must be "based on a 
reasonable medical judgment relying on the most current medical 
knowledge or the best available objective evidence," and the student must 
be afforded an opportunity to challenge the school’s "direct threat" 
determination, even in cases of "immediate concern."75 
E.  The Post-Shin Cases 
For institutions of higher education and their administrators—caught 
between their exposure to liability if a "foreseeable" suicide occurred and 
their desire to act in the ways that ultimately would be most helpful to both 
individual students of immediate concern and the greater population of 
students with serious mental health issues—the Schieszler and Shin cases 
posed a critical question:  Did these decisions signify a dramatic shift in 
courts’ views about the duty of college and university administrators to 
protect students from the risks of foreseeable harm?  In other words, was 
the pendulum swinging back from the general "no duty" view that had 
come to dominate that case law beginning in the 1970s toward something 
that more closely resembled the doctrine of in loco parentis or a general 
                                                                                                                 
university and several administrators, claiming among other things the violation of his rights 
under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  The case ultimately settled.  See 
Massie, supra note 8, at 671 nn.251–52 (referring to the George Washington University’s 
decision as "problematic"); see also Rob Capriccioso, Counseling Crisis, INSIDE HIGHER ED, 
Mar. 13, 2006, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/03/13/counseling (describing 
Nott’s lawsuit against the school) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 75. See Letter from Sheralyn Goldbecker, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights 
[hereinafter OCR], to Kent Chabotar, President, Guilford Coll., 26 NAT’L DISABILITY L. 
RPTR. 113 (March 6, 2003); Letter from Rhonda Bowman, OCR, to Lee Snyder, President, 
Bluffton Univ., Complaint No. 15-04-2042 (Dec. 22, 2004); Letter from Michael E. 
Gallagher, OCR, to Jean Scott, President, Marietta Coll., 31 NAT’L DISABILITY L. RPTR. 23 
(July 26, 2005).  For an excellent overview of the key OCR decisions and other issues 
pertaining to students with significant mental health issues, see Barbara A. Lee & Gail E. 
Abbey, College and University Students with Mental Disabilities:  Legal and Policy Issues, 
34 J.C. & U.L. 349 (2008). 
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duty to protect students from the risks of foreseeable harm?76  Or were 
Scheiszler and Shin more in the nature of aberrations—isolated decisions 
that were narrowly limited to the facts of those cases, never were tested on 
appeal, and were lacking in precedential or persuasive effect? 
Cases decided in the last few years—including cases in the same 
jurisdiction as Shin—suggest that the latter view is the correct one.  
Scheiszler and Shin did not herald any fundamental change in courts’ views 
about the obligation of schools and their administrators to protect students 
from harm, but instead have been revealed as isolated exceptions to what 
has remained the strong general view:  that colleges and their administrators 
have no legal duty to protect students from even foreseeable risks of harm, 
provided the risk was not one that the college itself created or one as to 
which the student was uniquely dependent upon the college for protection. 
Six months after the decision in Shin, in Mahoney v. Allegheny 
College,77 a trial court in Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor 
of two college administrators in a case arising from the suicide of a student, 
Charles Mahoney, in his off-campus fraternity.78  Charles had a history of 
depression and was receiving counseling from a licensed clinician who was 
the head of the college’s counseling center.79  Among other defendants, 
including Charles’s counselor, his parents sued the college’s Dean of 
Students and Assistant Dean of Students, both of whom had some 
awareness of Charles’s problems.80  The court held that these administrators 
had no duty to prevent Charles’s suicide as a matter of law.81  In doing so, 
the court not only adhered to the well-reasoned legal analysis in Jain but 
also validated the important policy arguments that had been advanced, but 
ignored by the court, in Shin.82 
The court in Mahoney noted that in general a defendant can have a 
duty to prevent suicide only if the defendant "has actual, physical custody 
of, and substantial control" over the decedent or the defendant "is a 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Professor Lake, at least for a time, suggested this might be the case, and further 
that such a trend was a positive one.  See BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 2 and accompanying 
text; Lake, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 77. No. AD 892-2003 (Ct. Com, Pl. of Crawford County, Pa. Civ. Div. Dec. 22, 2005) 
(on file with the author). 
 78. Id. at *24. 
 79. Id. at *3–11. 
 80. Id. at *11–13. 
 81. Id. at *25. 
 82. See id. at *22 (asserting that "the Jain case is factually and legally persuasive that 
there was no ‘special relationship’ nor ‘reasonably foreseeable’ events that would justify 
creating a duty to prevent suicide or notify Mahoney’s parents of any impending danger"). 
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specially trained medical or mental health professional, who has the precise 
duty and the control necessary for the physical and mental well-being of a 
patient . . . ."83  The court noted that the most recent appellate decision to 
address the duty to prevent suicide in a college or university setting was the 
Jain case, which the court found to be "factually and legally persuasive."84  
The court declined to follow the "special relationship" approach to duty in 
Shin because finding a "special relationship" outside the context of actual 
custody or control over an individual is "an elevation of form over 
substance that could lend itself to reactive . . . results [by judges which are] 
steeped in ‘hindsight,’ as compared to a careful and precise legal analysis 
required [to properly find] a duty of care."85  The "special relationship" 
analysis in Shin, the court concluded, "is in effect an attenuated and 
unarticulated form of ‘in loco parentis.’"86  The court also noted that 
imposing a duty of care would raise "legal and ethical" dilemmas involving 
student privacy rights as well as the rights of students with mental health 
disabilities.87 
The court in Mahoney also ruled that the administrators did not have 
even a "duty to notify . . . of impending danger," which the court 
recognized is "arguably less burdensome than the ‘duty to prevent 
suicide.’"88  The court recognized that "nonprofessional lay persons" lack 
the ability to assess the risk of suicide; that requiring them to notify parents 
or others can disrupt the student’s confidential clinical relationship; and that 
other negative consequences can flow from violating a "student’s right to 
privacy and expressed wishes involving notification."89  The court 
specifically recognized that requiring administrators to notify parents or 
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others of a student’s risk of suicide "may make matters worse and increase 
the pressure on the student to commit the act."90 
Other courts similarly have declined to follow the rationale of 
Scheiszler and Shin.  Notably, these include several cases in Massachusetts, 
the jurisdiction not only of Shin but also of the earlier, seminal decision in 
Mullins, on which the Shin and Scheiszler courts mistakenly relied. While 
these later Massachusetts cases are not suicide cases, they are closely 
analogous in that they involve the deaths of students who were known to 
have significant mental health issues and to present a foreseeable risk of 
harm to themselves or others. 
Bash v. Clark University91 arose from the death of Michele Bash, a 
freshman at Clark University, from an overdose of heroin in her dormitory 
room.92  The university required all freshmen to live on campus.93  It 
prohibited students under twenty-one years of age from possessing or 
consuming alcohol on campus and prohibited the possession, sale or use of 
illegal drugs.94  The university was located in a city that was known to have 
a problem with illegal narcotics, including overdoses of heroin, and the 
university had over twenty drug-related violations in each of the three years 
preceding Michele’s death.95  Moreover, university officials were aware 
that Michele had been experiencing personal problems; that she had been 
engaged in underage drinking; that her parents were concerned that she 
might be using drugs; and that in fact she had used heroin at least once.96  
After Michele died from an overdose of heroin, which she obtained from 
another freshman at Clark,97 Michele’s father sued the university and 
several of its administrators, claiming that they were negligent in failing to 
take steps necessary to protect Michele and in "misrepresenting to [him] 
that she would be provided with a safe and healthy environment while at 
Clark."98 
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 91. Bash v. Clark Univ., No. 2006-745A, 2006 WL 4114297 (Mass. Super. Nov. 20, 
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In a pair of decisions the trial court ruled that the administrators had no 
duty as a matter of law.99  Noting that "[t]he doctrine of in loco parentis has 
no application to the relationship between a modern university and its 
students," the court held that the administrators owed no duty to protect 
Michele from the heroin overdose in her dormitory room—even though the 
administrators were aware of her drug use and had recommended that she 
seek treatment from the university’s counseling and health centers—
because recognizing such a duty "would impose on university 
officials . . . an unreasonable burden that would be at odds with 
contemporary social values."100 
The court distinguished Shin on the basis that the administrators at 
Clark were not specifically aware of an imminent risk of harm to the 
student.101  In so doing, however, the court also implicitly criticized the 
rationale of Shin to the extent Shin endorsed the view that a "special 
relationship" properly could be based on the foreseeability of harm alone.  
The court recognized that while foreseeability is an important factor in 
determining whether a "special relationship" duty exists, foreseeability 
alone does not create a special relationship or otherwise give rise to a duty 
of care.102   Rather, the foreseeability of harm must be weighed against 
existing social values and customs, taking into account the burden the 
defendant would have to undertake if a duty were found.103  The court 
recognized that universities and their staff simply are not equipped to serve 
as omnipresent monitors of their students’ potentially self-injurious 
behavior, and that a duty cannot properly be based on "unrealistic 
expectation" about the ability of university officials to do so.104  A 
university, the court recognized, could not prevent student deaths resulting 
                                                                                                                 
 99. In the first decision, the court allowed a motion to dismiss the complaint as to four 
of the individual administrators at Clark:  the President, the Associate Dean of Students, the 
Assistant Dean of Students/Wellness Outreach Coordinator, and Michele’s academic 
probation advisor.  Bash v. Clark Univ., No. 2006-745A, 2006 WL 4114297, at *1.  In the 
second decision, the Court allowed a motion for summary judgment as to the university and 
the remaining four individually named defendants—the Dean of Students, the Director of 
Residential Life, the residential life area coordinator for Michele’s dormitory, and the Chief 
of Campus Police.  Id. at *4. 
 100. Id. at *4. 
 101. See id. at *6 ("The level of involvement the Clark administrators had with Ms. 
Bash was significantly different from the involvement of the MIT administrators with 
Shin."). 
 102. See id. at *4 ("[T]he foreseeability of physical harm is not the linchpin for 
determining the existence of a common-law duty under Massachusetts tort law."). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at *5. 
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from substance abuse "except possibly by posting guards in each dorm 
room on a 24-hour, 365-day per year basis."105  Moreover, such draconian 
monitoring of students simply could not be reconciled with the substantial 
privacy rights of students, which "society has come to regard as the 
norm."106 
The decision in Bash also is notable for its close reading of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s earlier decision in Mullins,107 
which the courts in Scheiszler and Shin mistakenly read as establishing a 
broad duty on the part of colleges and universities to protect their resident 
students from foreseeable harms.  The court in Bash correctly noted that 
Mullins established only a limited duty on the part of colleges to take 
reasonable steps to protect resident students from the risk of criminal 
assault by an intruder, as distinct from a general duty to police the "moral 
well-being" of students, and concluded that the burden of protecting 
students against the risks of substance abuse is "far more like" the latter, for 
which students and parents, but not the college, are responsible.108 
More recently another Massachusetts trial court, in Carman v. 
Shaffer,109 held that administrators at Tufts University had no duty as a 
matter of law to protect a student with a known history of mental health and 
drinking issues, who died in an off-campus fire that her parents claimed 
was caused by her inadequately treated depression.110  Wendy Carman 
entered Tufts as a freshman in September 2000.111  During the summer after 
her freshman year, while she was living at home, she was diagnosed with 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. (citing Crow v. State of California, 271 Cal. Rptr. 349, 360 (1990)).  Such an 
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depression for which she began taking medication.112  When she returned to 
Tufts for her sophomore year, she began attending counseling sessions at 
the Tufts counseling center and was given prescriptions for anti-depressant 
medication from a psychiatrist at the Tufts health service.113  In March of 
her sophomore year, Wendy terminated her counseling at Tufts, although 
her counselor believed that Wendy needed further counseling and made 
several attempts to contact her to set up a further appointment.114 
In the fall of her junior year, two Tufts students who lived with Wendy 
in an off-campus apartment met with one of the deans in the office of 
student affairs.115  The students expressed concern that Wendy seemed 
depressed.116  She was spending considerable time alone in her room, was 
drinking excessively, and was smoking in her room, which the students felt 
was dangerous.117  The dean called Wendy in to meet first with the dean 
and then with the university’s alcohol counselor.118  In these meetings 
Wendy did not appear to be in any imminent danger, but she admitted that 
she had a drinking problem and agreed that she should resume 
counseling.119  She indicated that she would be seeing a counselor at home 
over the winter break, which would begin soon.120  She also indicated that 
she was on medication for her depression.121  The dean planned to contact 
Wendy promptly following the winter break to arrange for Wendy to meet 
with a new alcohol counselor (the current one was leaving for a new job at 
the winter break), and the new counselor could help refer Wendy for any 
additional counseling she might need.122 Neither the dean nor the current 
alcohol counselor referred Wendy for a psychiatric evaluation or contacted 
the counseling center to see whether Wendy currently was receiving any 
counseling at Tufts.123 
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Wendy spent the winter break at home with her parents, who thought 
she was doing fine.124  Two days after her return to Tufts, she died in a fire 
in her apartment, which apparently was caused when she fell asleep after 
she had been drinking and smoking in bed.125  Wendy’s father sued the 
university and several university officials including the dean and the 
alcohol counselor, claiming that Wendy’s death could have been avoided if 
they had disciplined Wendy for underage drinking in violation of Tufts’s 
policy, notified the family of Wendy’s problems and her roommates’ 
concerns, and made an effort to determine whether Wendy actually was 
receiving any mental health counseling or treatment.126 
The court held that Tufts and its administrators had no duty to prevent 
Wendy’s death as a matter of law.127  The court first determined that no 
duty could be based upon any "voluntary undertaking" by the 
administrators under the principles of Restatement section 323.128  As was 
the case in Jain, nothing the administrators did put Wendy in a worse 
position than she would have been in if they had not undertaken to assist 
her and the administrators did not prevent Wendy from seeking help 
elsewhere.129  The court also determined that no duty could be established 
on the basis of a "special relationship" because the university-student 
relationship itself is not a "special relationship"; Tufts was not otherwise in 
a position of "control" over Wendy; and, unlike the situation in Shin, the 
administrators in Tufts were not presented with any immediate risk of harm 
to Wendy if they failed to act.130  The court in Carman, like the court in 
Bash, also found that it would be "unfair" as a matter of public policy to 
find a duty to prevent Wendy’s death on the part of Tufts’s administrators 
where Wendy’s mother, as a result of her close relationship with Wendy, 
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was aware not only of Wendy’s depression and treatment, but also that 
Wendy was engaged in underage drinking, that her housemates had 
expressed concerns about Wendy’s drinking and smoking to an alcohol 
counselor and a dean at Tufts, and that Wendy had been required to meet 
with the alcohol counselor and dean as a result of those concerns.131 
II.  Moving Forward:  Courts Should Continue to Resist Calls for the 
Imposition of New Duties to Prevent Student Suicide. 
The decisions in Mahoney, Bash, and Carman, as noted above, 
indicate that Scheiszler and Shin did not herald any fundamental change in 
courts’ views about the obligation of schools and their administrators to 
protect students from harm.  Rather, Scheiszler and Shin stand as isolated 
exceptions to what has remained the strong general view:  that colleges and 
their administrators have no legal duty to protect students from even 
foreseeable risks of harm, provided the risk was not one that the college 
itself created or one as to which the student was uniquely dependent upon 
the college for protection.  Colleges and universities do not "desperately 
need more legal guidance on the parameters of managing student suicide 
danger,"132 as Professor Lake would have it, but instead have all the "legal 
guidance" they need in a well-developed and well-reasoned body of cases 
that hold that colleges and their administrators rarely have a duty to protect 
students, including potentially suicidal ones, from harm.  The calls for the 
imposition of new legal duties on the part of college and university 
administrators, such as those advanced by Professor Lake and Professor 
Massie, are misguided in several respects. 
First, they are based on the mistaken view that new duty rules are 
needed in order for college administrators to "do the right thing."  Professor 
Lake, for example, asserts that college administrators engage in too much 
"information siloing" and turf management, rather than effectively sharing 
information and coordinating their efforts.133  He offers little support for 
this assertion, however.134  It also is counter-intuitive that administrators in 
today’s environment—steeped in countless articles and conference 
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presentations about lawsuits like the Shin case—would be inclined to 
hunker down in an administrative silo or engage in turf battles over students 
at risk of suicide.  If Professor Lake’s portrayal of such administrative 
behavior ever was correct, it certainly is no longer.  Colleges and 
universities today have widely adopted interdisciplinary, "at-risk student" or 
"case management" teams, which comprise student affairs, mental health, 
campus police, and other professionals, the very purpose of which is to 
engage in a coordinated effort to share information, expertise, resources and 
perspectives with respect to students who are perceived to be at risk of 
harming themselves or others.135 
Commentators who call for the imposition of greater legal duties also 
err in assuming that the reported facts of a very small number of student 
suicide cases are indicative of how situations involving at-risk students 
typically are handled. This problem is particularly acute if one relies upon 
trial court decisions—such as Scheiszler and Shin—because of the 
procedural posture in which those cases are decided.  These decisions 
typically involve the resolution of a motion to dismiss one or more counts 
of the plaintiff’s complaint or a motion for summary judgment.  Neither 
posture involves a complete factual record, as would be developed at trial.  
Moreover, in the case of a motion to dismiss, the court’s recitation of the 
"facts" will reflect the court’s obligation to accept the plaintiff’s allegations 
of fact as true.136  The hazards of reading too much into the reported facts of 
such trial court decisions is amply demonstrated by the Shin case, where the 
parents ultimately revealed, upon settling the case, that they had come to 
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believe their daughter’s death was not a suicide at all, but rather a tragic 
accident.137 
Finally, and most importantly, the imposition of new duties to prevent 
student suicide would make students less safe, rather than more so, because 
they would incentivize college administrators not to become involved with 
students who might be at risk.  Massie’s proposed "rule of law"—like the 
holdings in the few cases that have found that a college administrator can 
have a duty to act when presented with an "imminent probability" of 
student suicide—depends on the depth of the administrator’s awareness of 
the risk.  But if the administrator’s awareness of the risk of harm will 
determine whether the administrator has a legal duty—i.e., whether he faces 
exposure to personal liability—then the administrator will have every 
incentive not to acquire such awareness.  Instead, his incentive will be to 
respond in just the way that we do not want the associate dean to respond in 
the scenario described at the beginning of this article:  by declaring his lack 
of expertise in addressing mental health issues, declaring his lack of first-
hand knowledge about the student at issue, and determining firmly not to 
acquire such knowledge or otherwise become involved. 
The central paradox in cases involving at-risk students is that imposing 
greater tort duties on the part of college administrators would not enhance 
student safety, but would undermine it. Courts generally have held, and will 
continue to hold, that college administrators have no legal duty to protect 
students from the risk of self-harm.  That approach is sound not only as a 
matter of fundamental tort law but also as a matter of pure policy. With rare 
exceptions college administrators do act reasonably in response to 
information that a student may be at-risk. They should be insulated from the 
imposition of additional legal duties—not so that they can avoid helping 
such students but so that they will continue to have every incentive to do so. 
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